Recent empirical studies have documented the dramatic growth of privatizations globally and the resultant efficiency gains. We develop a theoretical model that incorporates the costs and benefits of privatization as complex options. This framework allows us to highlight the impact of government's overall public sector policies on the potential benefits of privatization, illustrate the manner in which a government's specific policies concerning the SOE before and after privatization affects its share price at privatization and examine the role of subsidies, tax shields and bankruptcy costs in determining the optimal leverage and investment choices made by the firm's management after privatization. It yields testable hypotheses and policy implications concerning the prioritization of SOE sales, public sector investment policies, tax subsidies, entry restrictions, and the state's use of monopoly power.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent growth in the sales of previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private investors in Europe, Southeast Asia and South America marks a dramatic reversal in public policy concerning the state's participation in business on a worldwide scale. The magnitude of this economic phenomenon is overwhelming. Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley (1992) state that "more than 80 countries have launched ambitious efforts to privatize their state-owned enterprises. Since 1980, more than 2000 SOEs have been privatized in developing countries, 6,800 worldwide.'' The total value of worldwide privatizations exceeded $185 billion by 1990, and still continues unabated [see Goodman and Loveman (1991) ]. This is not surprising given that privatizations have become an integral part of the reform and globalization strategy in many economies. The realization that the domestic capital markets, and their integration with the global markets, can boost economic growth have resulted in liberalization policies targeted specifically at increasing the supply/demand of securities and the development of prudent rules, regulations, disclosure, legal and accounting practices necessary for a well functioning capital market [see Errunza (1999) and references therein]. Indeed, in many non-U.S. markets, some of the largest and most liquid firms are privatized firms that have dramatically influenced the market capitalization, trading volumes, and local investor participation in these economies.
1 These firms constitute a significant portion of country funds that are held by small foreign investors and given their investability, are preferred foreign assets (that trade on local markets or as depository receipts in global markets) in institutional portfolios. Thus, publicly traded privatized firms have played an important role in integrating global capital markets and provided an opportunity to investors to obtain the benefits of international diversification without having to trade abroad [see Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999) ].
The stated objectives of most privatization programs include revenue collection;
promotion of efficiency gains; reduction of government interference; development of capital markets and widening of share ownership; introduction of competition and exposure to market discipline [see Price-Waterhouse (1989, page 10) and Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) ]. The success of privatizations in achieving these objectives has been examined in many empirical studies. For example, while earlier studies such as those by Kay and Thompson (1986) and Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) suggested that privatizations did not promote economic efficiency, recent empirical analyses of Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) and Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1992) appear to refute this. Indeed, in a comprehensive survey, Megginson and Netter (1999) present conclusive evidence that privately-owned firms outperform SOEs, privatizations significantly improve the operating and financial performance of divested firms and governments have raised significant revenues through the sale of SOEs.
It is also widely acknowledged that the privatization programs in a number of countries, including Mexico and the U.K., have only achieved some of their stated objectives.
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Such limited success may be attributed to three factors. First, these programs had to accommodate internal trade-offs, e.g. revenue maximization versus wider local participation. Second, these programs were forced to compromise some of 1 Some examples of major publicly-traded privatized firms include, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone of Japan, British their goals due to political/social considerations. 3 Finally, the limited success of privatizations may also be due to a lack of an integrated analysis of the most basic financial issues at stake. These include the magnitude of government subsidies provided to the SOE; the design of privatizations in terms of the preferred clientele (corporate, individual, domestic or foreign), the residual government ownership, the taxation and competitive industry environment following a sell-off; and the sequence in which SOEs should be brought to the market.
There are, of course, numerous extant theoretical analyses of specific aspects of the privatization question. Hayek's (1944) book, The Road to Serfdom, contributed immensely in the move away from statism and towards widescale privatizations. Earlier theoretical papers have addressed issues related to state versus private ownership.
These studies either favored state ownership or were inconclusive. 4 More recently, Vining and Boardman (1992) and Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have demonstrated the importance of private ownership over public ownership. Papers by Cornelli and Li (1997) and Owen (1993, 1995) develop models that examine the trade-off between revenue maximization and economic efficiency by focusing on ownership stake to be sold and the sequencing of the sale of SOEs respectively. However, we know of no previous theoretical framework that allows a comprehensive examination of the issues mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
In this paper we develop a contingent-claims model to value the equity claim of a privatized firm that incorporates such diverse factors as production efficiencies, monopoly power, government debt guarantees, tax shields and bankruptcy costs. We 2 Although the state ownership of business in central, eastern and western European has declined dramatically over the period 1978 through 1991, the role of SOEs in developing countries has shown very little tendency to decline -see Magginson and Netter (1999) for details. 3 Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996 a, b) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) provide excellent discussions of the relationship between public sector employment and output; government subsidies; political objectives and the restructuring through privatizations. 4 See for example, Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) and Laffont and Tirole (1991) .
focus on privatizations through an equity issue, which frequently dominate alternative modes of privatizations 5 and have often been of record-breaking proportions.
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Our model incorporates these diverse factors as contingent claims on the firm's assets and yields three sets of results. Specifically, Proposition 1 highlights the impact of government's overall public sector policies on the potential benefits of privatization.
Propositions 2 and 3 illustrate the manner in which a government's specific policies concerning the SOE before and after privatization affects its share price at privatization.
Finally, Proposition 4 examines the role of subsidies, tax shields and bankruptcy costs in determining the optimal leverage and investment choices made by the firm's management after privatization.
Our analysis offers several policy implications. It suggests that the government should prioritize its privatization program by selling off its most heavily subsidized firms and those from minor sectors which are the least correlated to the government's other assets and hence least likely to upset political and social interest groups. The value gains are higher from sell-offs by governments that have pursued conservative public sector investment policies, ceteris paribus. To maintain SOE ownership in domestic private hands, appropriate tax subsidies and restrictions, should be considered to level the playing field vis-a-vis foreign bidders. This is consistent with the evidence present by Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) . Further, SOEs that were better managed prior to privatization and have fully exploited any monopoly power in the product market, or those which would be handicapped with bureaucratic malaise or trade union pressures after privatization, would be less attractive to investors, ceteris paribus.
5 For an analysis of voucher privatizations, see Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) . 6 The following examples are from Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) . The $4.8 billion equity issue to implement British Telecom's privatization by the Thatcher government in the U.K., in November 1984, was the largest equity issue in history up to that time. Similarly, the sequential privatization of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) during late 1986 and 1987, by the Japanese government was of astonishing magnitude. In the initial tranche alone $15.1 billion of equity was issued which was the largest equity issue in history. The issues in the second and third tranches of $40.3 billion and $22.4 billion were even larger. The $1.65 billion Conrail share privatization in the U.S. was also the largest U.S. share issue up to that time [see Baldwin and Bhattacharya (1991) for an analysis].
On one hand, this malaise is likely to be the most acute in regulated industries. Thus, expected efficiency gains after privatization are likely to be smaller in such sectors. On the other hand, if the SOE operated competitively even in government hands then the anticipated additional gains after privatization would also be small. Thus, there may not be significant differences in the post-privatization efficiency gains across regulated and competitive sector privatizations, as Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) find. Finally, if bankruptcy costs after privatization are significant, as they are likely to be once government guaranties are removed, then the firm may be forced to reduce its debt level as well as opt for safer investments. This result is consistent with the evidence presented by Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) . Thus, our analysis provides a theoretical explanation for some documented empirical findings and suggests important policy guidelines.
Our theoretical results yield several new testable hypotheses. First, our model suggests that the government should sell off the most heavily subsidized firms first. The degree of subsidy a firm receives in terms of a debt guarantee in our model depends on the government's revenues from other operations and the debt associated with such other operations. Thus, the relative size of an SOE vis-a-vis the total size of the government sector could be used as a proxy for (the inverse of) the debt guarantee that it receives. This postulated (inverse) relationship between the relative size of an SOE 7 It should be noted that Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley (1992) have argued that it would be optimal to sell off small-and midsized SOEs as quickly as possible. This is consistent with our hypotheses since such firms are likely to be only peripherally related to the main bulk of the government sector and receive the greatest degree of debt guarantee.
8 It should be noted, however, that our model did not consider the potential transaction costs associated with restructuring.
Clearly, if such costs were large and could be reduced by private owners, then the government would be better off to sell the SOE without restructuring it. Moreover, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996b) argue that managers and politicians may be inclined to maintain the status quo and resist efficiency improvements. Instead, they would restructure by making new investments funded by additional subsidies. That is a fundamentally different proposition from the one analyzed in our model. In our framework, new investments would be funded by liquidating existing ones and not through additional subsidies. Thus, any empirical test of our model's prediction must first discriminate between such negative restructuring and those made to take advantage of competitive opportunities albeit at higher risk. In Section II we develop our model. The main results and their policy implications are described in Section III. Section IV concludes. All Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
II. THE MODEL

A. The Basic Framework
We first describe the differences in the value of debt and equity claims on the assets of a company that is owned by private investors versus the government.
Let A be the stochastic asset value of a company that has one class of debt outstanding which has a face value T F at maturity date T and pays no coupon payments in the interim period. Then, this company's current debt value, following Merton (1974) , may be written as:
( 1) ), , , (
where r is the risk-free interest rate, ) , , (
σ is a European put option on the firm's assets, A , which has an instantaneous return volatility, A σ , and the option's exercise price is T F . This put option denotes the default risk premium charged by the company's debt-holders. Therefore, in the absence of any subsidies or implicit government guarantees that may be provided to a firm, the current value of its equity is:
( 2) ). , , (
In the presence of an implicit loan guarantee provided by the government to an SOE's debtholders, the debtholders will charge a lower default risk premium and the company's equity value would be lower.
12 The government's loan guarantee may be perceived as providing the company's debtholders with a claim on other government assets if the company's assets are insufficient to pay them off.
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That is, the debtholders' claim at maturity may now be written as:
where GT A and GT F denote other government assets and liabilities respectively at time
14 The present value of T D in (3) can be stated as:
where H denotes the present value of an artificial asset that pays nothing until maturity and then pays
where 12 This follows from the standard asset-substitution moral hazard incentive for equity whereby shareholders benefit at the cost of debtholders through riskier assets and vice versa. 14 The SOE's debtholders have a junior claim on the other government assets since these are collateralized to the government's other creditors, just as the assets of the specific SOE under consideration are pledged to the SOE's own debtholders.
A is the current value of the SOE's assets under government control, and From (4) it follows that the equity value of an SOE that receives an implicit guarantee from the government is,
). , , ( (2) and (5) indicates that the subsidized equity value, S E , is lower than the unsubsidized equity value that a private owner would receive for the same firm.
Formally, this value gain to private owners is given by:
Note that G is strictly positive in the above equation since the SOE debtholders now obtain a contingent claim,
σ , to some payoffs on the government's other assets G A and lose nothing since this contingent claim never takes negative values [see Stulz and Johnson (page 517, 1985) for more details]. That is, after an SOE sale the company's debtholders no longer receive government protection, which is valued at G .
This leads to a wealth transfer from debtholders to equityholders ceteris paribus. Thus, as a result of privatization, equity (debt) value increases (decreases) by G .
15 See Stulz and Johnson (1985) for a detailed analysis of complex options.
We analyze this issue in greater detail in the next section. However, it is worth noting at this juncture that since the value gains from privatization that accrue to the private owners stem in part from such a wealth transfer, the viability of the SOE privatization may crucially depend on the debtholders' bargaining power ex ante. Our model assumes that debtholders have no bargaining power. In reality, this would depend on the identity of the government's creditors. This group could include large institutional lenders such as international agencies that may impose covenants preventing the SOE's sale without prior permission.
The welfare implications of an SOE privatization are also worth examining.
Implicitly our model assumes that the firm's debtholders are private investors. Thus, any additional revenue gains generated through a privatization accrue entirely to the government. However, the government may hold the SOE's debt too. Any gains from the SOE's sale would then be offset by the corresponding loss to the government's debt position in the SOE. Therefore, increasing the government's total revenues may not be a sufficient reason to sell an SOE under these circumstances. Instead, the long-run operational efficiencies that the firm may enjoy under private ownership, and the concomitant improvement in social welfare, may be a more compelling rationale for such a sale. We discuss such efficiency issues in our integrated framework.
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16 Here we assume as a starting point of our analysis that the firm's cash flows, A, and debt level, FT, does not change after privatization. We relax these assumptions later in this section. 17 Our model does not consider related social welfare issues such as employment generation that are also of critical importance to policy-makers. If operational efficiency under private ownership is achieved through job cuts that add a burden to the exchequer then such costs should be weighed against the potential revenue gains from privatization. Our analysis does not examine these prospects. It should be noted that Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) suggest that employment at a privatized firm does not in fact decline under private management. Further, a governmentcontrolled firm may provide a public good or an intermediate good that is critical in the production of a public good. The government's cost of producing this good under state control, and thereby potentially securing a steady flow of the product, would have to be compared to the cost of buying the good from a private manufacturer after the SOE has been privatized in a full treatment of the social welfare aspects of privatization.
If the firm changes its capital structure after privatization, from T F to P T F , then the model described above would be slightly altered. By replacing
equation (2), the privatized firm's equity value could be written as:
The net change in the firm's equity value after privatization could once again be calculated from equations (5) and (7) as:
There are, however, several other factors, in addition to leverage changes and government debt guarantees, which may influence an SOE's equity value after privatization. We next focus on three possible additional influences on the firm's value that have been frequently discussed in the literature: (i) efficiency gains,(ii) transfer of voting control and (iii) tax shields and bankruptcy costs.
B. Efficiency Gains and Voting Control
Among the most significant criticisms of SOEs has been the ostensible loss in operational efficiency due to state control. Such an efficiency loss may be due to misallocation of resources and hence a sub-optimal level of production. For instance, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996a) suggest in their theoretical analysis that SOEs over-produce in order to maximize employment for political reasons. These authors argue that an effective restructuring of an SOE, whereby both cash flow rights and voting control rights pass from government to private hands, would increase efficiency since the government would no longer have any incentive to provide the firm's managers with operational subsidies that encouraged them to over-employ and over-produce. On the other hand, Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh's (1994) results suggest that a firm's average employment level increases post-privatization, which is diametrically opposite to the Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996a) hypothesis. Moreover, the degree of monopoly power exploited by the firm before and after privatization may have a significant impact on its valuation.
Regardless of the possible reasons for an SOE's inefficiency, it is important to note that several recent empirical studies strongly conclude that a firm's transfer from state to private hands leads to significant efficiency gains. 18 We take this as the starting point for our subsequent analysis and postulate that the firm's cash flow from operating the company is greater in private hands than if the company was state-owned. In particular, we assume that the efficiency gains from privatization may emanate from two sources (i) degree of potential monopoly power that is realized by the private owners after privatization; and (ii) operational efficiency gains due to superior managerial efforts by the new management. Clearly, such changes can be implemented by the new private management if corporate control is handed over to it by the state manager.
Thus, it is critical that the government retains only a minority voting stake in the firm after privatization for the new private management to implement any potential efficiency gains. Such an assumption is validated by Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh's (1994) empirical observation that share privatizations lead to efficiency gains only when the shares sold lead to a transfer of voting control from the government to private hands.
No such efficiency gains are noted when the government sells shares in the SOE merely to raise capital without relinquishing control.
We model these diverse factors that govern potential efficiency gains by assuming that the privatized firm's cash flows, P A , may be written as: . In other words, we assume that the potential efficiency gain λ is a decreasing function of the government's minority equity stake in the privatized firm.
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The degree of monopoly power exploited by the SOE prior to privatization is denoted by 1 0 ≤ < γ and it is assumed that 0 )
. 20 If γ was less than one when the firm was under state control then the state did not it fully exploit its monopoly power. Such a scenario is plausible when the government deliberately offers goods for which it is a monopolist producer, at a discounted price to meet social welfare or political objectives. Some utilities as well as some government services fall into this category in several countries. We assume for simplicity that all monopoly power is extracted by the private owners after privatization. Thus, ) 1 ( γ − denotes the degree to which the firm's cash flows can be enhanced after privatization solely by exploiting monopoly rents in the product market. That is, a lower γ indicates that the privatized 19 Strictly speaking, changes in the government's equity control should have little or no impact unless it transfers the control of the company from government to private hands or vice versa. That is, λα is negative only in an ∈-neighborhood of α C and is zero elsewhere. In our subsequent analysis we focus on the more interesting case where a change in the degree of ownership does influence the firm's valuation after privatization. That is, we restrict our analysis to the case when the government's equity stake α lies within the ∈-neighborhood of α C . firm can extract greater monopoly rents and increase its cash flows which is represented by the negative sign of the partial derivative, γ λ .
Given such efficiency gains, the change in equity value due to privatization stated in equation (8) would be altered to:
Contrasting equations (8) and (10) 
Noting that the put option value is a decreasing function of the current value of the underlying asset indicates that an increase in the firm's cash flows from A to P A due to efficiency gains partially offset the "guarantee removal" benefits that privatized SOE shareholders enjoy at the cost of their debtholders.
C. Tax Shields and Bankruptcy Costs
Tax write-offs may potentially be a factor for private investors (corporations) to bid for SOEs. This may be particularly true for foreign multinational corporations which 20 λ could also be a function of other factors such as the ownership stake retained by former state managers of the SOE who may possess superior information about the firm. may bid for SOEs to maximize their tax shields and also to diversify internationally.
Assume that the bidding corporation has profits from its other operations and hence is subject to corporate tax rate of τ percent. Then if the SOE purchased by this corporation registered a loss, the corporation's tax bill would decline by τ times the SOE's loss. Such a tax benefit could formally be written as:
where the corporation's tax write-off, τ ∆ , is contingent on the privatized company registering a loss.
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Then, combining equations (10) and (11), we may write the change in equity value due to a transfer of ownership of a potentially loss-bearing SOE from government to private hands as:
We conclude this section by incorporating the role of bankruptcy costs into our model. If the firm faces liquidation costs upon bankruptcy then its net tax shield may be lower. Specifically, if the bankruptcy cost, β is also proportional to the size of default, then the net gain from privatization may be written as: 21 We do not explicitly model operating costs in our analysis. The only cost the firm must bear is its interest obligation. In our one-period framework that implies the firm registers a loss when its debt obligation, T F , exceeds its revenues, P T A , at maturity, i.e., when the firm is bankrupt. The present value of this contingency is given by the put option
That is, "bankruptcy'' is analogous to "operating loss'' in our one-period model.
22 For simplicity, we assume that the SOE is not taxed while under state control. That is, government subsidies outweigh any potential tax revenues from SOEs. Therefore, the firm does not generate any tax loss shield while under government control. Moreover, the firm remains untaxed after privatization. This is consistent with the common practice of governments to offer a tax holiday to SOE buyers.
In short, the privatized firm faces a trade-off between tax shields and bankruptcy costs associated with increased leverage as we discuss in the next section.
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III. RESULTS AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The model described in the previous section yields several interesting policy implications. We assume that the government's objective is to maximize the revenues earned through an equity privatization, i.e., to maximize V ∆ .
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The recent empirical evidence cited earlier strongly suggests that virtually any privatization whereby the government relinquishes control of an SOE to private shareholders benefits the corporation. However, no formal analysis has been hitherto provided regarding the types of SOEs that would most benefit from such transfer of ownership. Neither have the influences of the government sector's size and the interrelated nature of SOE operations on the value gains from privatization been examined.
We provide a detailed examination of the impact of overall government operations on the potential benefits from privatization in Proposition 1 below.
PROPOSITION 1. The change in the firm's equity value due to privatization, V ∆ , is: (i) an increasing function of the government's other cash flows, G A ;
23 See Leland (1994) for a recent analysis of such a trade-off in determining a firm's optimal capital structure and the nature of debt covenants. 24 This objective is identical to revenue maximization provided the SOE's debt is in private hands. However, if the SOE's debt is provided by other government financial institutions then from equation (6) it follows that the gain in equity value [given by equation (13)] would be partially offset by a concomitant loss in the government's other lending agencies value. Thus, our model highlights a trade-off that the government must address prior to initiating an equity privatization programme.
( 
Proposition 2(i) follows by first noting that the SOE debt's market value is an increasing function of its face value, T F . Then, recognizing that the net change in the firm's equity value, V ∆ , given by equation (13), is an increasing function of the market value of the SOE's debt prior to privatization, yields the stated result.
Proposition 2(ii) and (iii) are based on the assumption of joint lognormality of the returns distributions of A and G A and numerical simulation results obtained by Stulz and Johnson (1985) . Proposition 2(ii) states that as the degree of correlation between the SOE's asset returns and those of the government's other assets increases it reduces the value of the implicit guarantee of the government to reimburse the SOE's debtholders upon default from the surplus cash flows of these other assets. This in turn reduces the magnitude of the net change in the firm's equity value due to privatization, V ∆ since the SOE's debtholders (equityholders) now lose (gain) marginally less (more) from the wealth transfer that arises from privatization.
Proposition 2(iii) indicates that an increase in A
σ has an ambiguous impact on the firm's equity value ex-post privatization. However, numerical analysis conducted by Stulz and Johnson (1985) 
Proposition 2 yields some important policy implications. Proposition 2(i) and (ii)
suggest that the bids for equity shares would be highest for those firms that are least correlated to the government's other operations and/or have the highest levels of debt, ceteris paribus. Thus, all other factors being constant, the government should optimally sell off such SOEs first. Note that since the firms least correlated with the government's other operations are also likely to be from a minor segment of the government sector, their sales are less likely to upset the political status quo which is often a critical issue in implementing privatizations. Proposition 2(iii) indicates that if the SOE under consideration for privatization is very negatively correlated with the government's other assets and has a relatively low level of risk compared to the government's other assets then the government could improve the valuation gains to equityholders from privatization by undertaking riskier investment strategies prior to privatization.
We next examine the impacts of the government's firm-specific policies post privatization on the change in the firm's equity value due to privatization. These results are provided in Proposition 3 below. 
a decreasing function of the monopoly power exploited in the product market by the government, γ if:
Proposition 3(i) follows directly from the fact that the buyer of the SOE obtains a tax shelter, that is proportional to its tax rate τ , by writing off the SOE's loss against its other corporate profits. That is, two bidders who employ equally efficient technologies of production may view the SOE's equity value quite differently since they face different tax rates on corporate profits. Thus, our framework allows us to make a distinction in the valuation of an SOE by foreign versus domestic bidders who may arguably face different tax rates. In particular, if foreign bidders face higher marginal tax rates than their domestic counterparts, then they are likely to bid higher for the loss-making SOE since it would generate a relatively larger (contingent) tax shield for them.
It may, however, be in the government's political interest to ensure that SOE ownership remains in domestic private hands. In order to do so, our analysis suggests that the government would have to offer domestic bidders tax breaks or other subsidies in order to ensure that they remain competitive against foreign bidders for the SOE.
Alternatively, the government may legally restrict foreign buyers from bidding for the SOE. In fact, such restrictions have usually been imposed against foreign bidders in most global privatization programs to date [see Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) ].
Proposition 3(ii) indicates that an increase in the minority government's equity stake in the privatized firm has four countervailing influences on the firm's equity value. 25 First, an increase in government ownership reduces the privatized firm's operational efficiency and thus the firm's cash flows. This tends to reduce its equity value. Second, lower cash flows also increase the riskiness of the firm's debt. This increases the contingent cost of bankruptcy. The sum of these two negative impacts is given by the first term on the LHS of the inequality stated in the Proposition. Third, riskier debt also increases the value of the implicit guarantee, G , enjoyed by the firm's earlier debtholders, when it was state-owned. This leads to a wealth transfer from debtholders 25 Note that this result is based on the assumption that
. It is important to note that if the government had a majority stake in the firm then the privatization would have been merely to generate revenue. In such a case, the management policy would remain unchanged and a change in the government equity stake would not affect the firm's efficiency. That is, λ would equal 1 as discussed earlier. Such a hypothesis is validated by Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) who also find that efficiency gains only arise from "control" privatizations and not from "revenue" privatizations.
to equityholders, as well as increases the firm's contingent loss tax shield. These last two positive effects are denoted by the second term on the LHS of the inequality given in the Proposition. Thus, as stated in Proposition 3(ii) the net impact of an increase in α on the firm's equity value is negative if the first term in the inequality stated in the Proposition, has a greater magnitude than the second.
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Proposition 3(iii) is analogous to Proposition 3(ii). If the government exploited a large degree of monopoly power in the product market then the firm after being privatized would have a smaller scope to exploit such unrealized potential. This would tend to diminish the firm's efficiency gains after privatization. As described earlier, such a decline in efficiency influences the firm's equity value in four ways. Once again, if the direct negative effect of a reduction in cash flows, and increase in bankruptcy costs, dominates the positive effects of the tax shield increase and the additional wealth transfer from debtholders to equityholders, then an increase in γ tends to diminish the firm's shareholders' gains from privatization.
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Thus, our results indicate that a more active role by the government in the management of the company even after privatization may not necessarily be detrimental to the firm's shareholders since it may enhance tax shields and wealth transfers from debtholders. Further, our analysis reveals that SOEs that were better managed by the government before being privatized tend to yield less of an equity value increase upon privatization ceteris paribus. This occurs since the privatized firm's management have less of a scope to realize unexploited monopoly power if the government already acted in a relatively entrepreneurial fashion prior to privatization.
26 This may explain the negative reception to some privatization proposals by the market. For example, the partial privatization of the Greek telecommunication monopoly, OTE, was recently postponed partly because the issue did not attract much investor attention in Athens due to concerns regarding the firm's growth potential stemming from the government's insistence to retain management control [see Financial Times, Wednesday, November 9, 1994, page 16] . 27 The negative and positive effects mentioned here are captured by the first and second terms on the LHS of the inequality stated in the Proposition, respectively.
Note that our analysis assumed that the privatized firm would exploit all remaining monopoly power ) 1 ( γ − in the market. Instead it may be postulated that the firm after privatization only succeeds in exploiting some fraction 1 0 ≤ < φ of such potential. Arguably, φ which captures the bureaucratic malaise, or trade union pressures in SOEs that prevent rapid change even after privatization may be very significant, especially in erstwhile socialist countries. Therefore, the influence of γ described above may be minimal in some instances. In fact such a conjecture finds some support in the recent empirical evidence provided by Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) who find no significant difference in efficiency gains after privatization in regulated versus competitive markets. This may be explained within the context of our model if φ is very small in regulated industries suggesting that entrenched interests in firms in these industries prevent quick change to exploit market conditions.
A further empirical examination of this aspect of privatization appears to be necessary to fully determine the relationship between the government's managerial skills prior to privatization and the gains that accrue from privatization. 28 Finally, we examine the optimal investment and capital structure policies of the firm after privatization. These results are summarized in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4.
(a) The change in the firm's equity value due to privatization, V ∆ , is: Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) also find that the board of management is significantly altered, both in composition and size, after privatization. They also find some evidence that the "greater the change in a firm's control structure the greater the improvement in its operating performance after privatization'' [page 445]. In the context of our model, such a board re-organization may be interpreted as an attempt by the new private owners to increase φ or stimulate market-driven managerial incentives. 
Proposition 4(i) and (ii) indicate that the privatized firm has three countervailing influences that dictate its optimal capital structure and asset risk decision. On one hand, higher leverage or asset risk makes its debt riskier and this tends to increase the risk premium charged by debtholders or lower the market value of debt. In other words, it leads to a wealth transfer from debt to equity. Moreover, such an increase in leverage also increases the firm's tax shield. These two positive effects of leverage or riskier investment strategies are partially offset by the simultaneous increase in the firm's contingent bankruptcy costs due to higher leverage or asset risk. The net impact is negative if the "bankruptcy cost" dominates the first two. Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) find that firms do tend to reduce their leverage ratios after privatization. This suggests that the potential bankruptcy costs for such firms are probably very significant. Thus, Proposition 4 provides two empirically testable hypotheses. It suggests that if bankruptcy costs are significant then the firm after privatization may be forced to reduce its debt level as well as make safer investments than it did prior to privatization. While the former hypothesis has been empirically validated by recent evidence, the latter remains to be empirically tested.
Some additional clarificatory comments are in order before we conclude this section.
First, governments typically sell off several SOEs over the course of time. Our framework should be viewed as a snap-shot perspective of a single round of privatizations which is a part of such a dynamic long-term privatization process. Clearly, the government's remaining asset portfolio's size and volatility, and hence the value of the debt guarantee provided to remaining SOEs, change significantly after a particular privatization round is concluded. These revised parameter estimates must then be substituted into our model to yield the appropriate privatization strategies for the next round of SOE sales.
Second, the option-theoretic framework presented here has some pros and cons.
The model has some clear advantages. It highlights the wealth transfers among agents in a full-information scenario and also enables us to develop a valuation model that comprehensively addresses numerous factors that influence privatization. It is important, however, to recognize that these factors are only some of the potential influences on an In that context, come potential drawbacks of the option-theoretic framework should be noted. It does not enable us to examine potential conflicts among agents under asymmetric information, which has been the focus of several theoretical analyses on this subject mentioned earlier. Further, the option-theoretic model developed here is a single period one. However, the analysis could be extended into a multi-period one while retaining the basic option-theoretic set-up. Finally, some of the results derived rely on specific distributional assumptions regarding the firm's and the government's cash flows.
This handicap is, however, not unique to the option-based approach. Any framework that examines agency problems under asymmetric information must also assume a probability distribution for various future states of the world.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The dramatic growth of privatizations across the world has been exhaustively documented. Such sales of state owned enterprises to private owners represents a clear reversal in previous public policy when government control of key sectors was considered mandatory for social welfare and the smooth supply of essential goods and services to the economy. The rationale behind privatization programs has been to improve efficiency through entrepreneurial management. There are also significant benefits from the market integrating impact of publicly traded privatized firms. However, it is nevertheless recognized in policy debates that there are costs as well as benefits associated with privatizations.
This paper attempts to provide an integrated theoretical analysis of some of the common factors that may affect the value of a firm upon privatization, suggested in such debates. It allows us to highlight the impact of government's overall public sector policies on the potential benefits of a particular round of privatization, illustrate the manner in which a government's specific policies concerning the SOE before and after privatization affects its share price at privatization and examine the role of subsidies, tax shields and bankruptcy costs in determining the optimal leverage and investment choices made by the firm's management after privatization.
Our analysis offers several testable hypotheses and policy implications. It highlights the fact that equity privatizations implicitly tax the SOE's debtholders since they forego a valuable debt guarantee once the SOE is privatized. As long as debtholders are private investors, the government's objective of maximizing revenues is analogous to maximizing the firm's post-privatization equity value. Our model indicates that in order to attain this objective, the government should prioritize its privatization program by first selling off its most heavily subsidized firm from a minor sector which is the least correlated to the government's other assets and hence least likely to upset political and social interest groups. Sell-offs by governments that have pursued conservative public sector investment policies, ceteris paribus generate greater value gains. To maintain SOE ownership in domestic private hands, appropriate tax subsidies and restrictions, should be considered to level the playing field vis-a-vis foreign bidders.
Further, SOEs that fully exploited any monopoly power in the product market prior to privatization, or might be bogged down with bureaucratic malaise or trade union pressures after privatization, are less attractive to investors, ceteris paribus. Finally, if bankruptcy costs after privatization are significant, as they are likely to be once government guaranties are removed, then the firm may be forced to reduce its debt level as well as opt for safer investments. To summarize, our framework provides a theoretical explanation for some of the documented empirical findings, puts forward new testable hypotheses and suggests important policy guidelines concerning any global privatizations.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof of (i): Substituting (9) in (13) yields:
, and then partially differentiating RHS of (A.1) with respect to G A yields: 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof of (i): Partially differentiating RHS of (A.1) with respect to τ , yields the desired result that: 
